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1. Introduction 
Prior to the global financial crisis of 2007-09, mainstream thinking on financial policy was that it 
was sufficient for central banks and financial supervisors to monitor the soundness of individual 
financial institutions. But in line with the fallacy of composition, the system as a whole behaves 
differently from its individual components. A case in point is the fire sale of assets during a downturn. 
While understandable from the risk management perspective of an individual financial institution that 
wants to reduce its risk, such selling makes the price decline worse, causing a vicious downward spiral 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 2011). Another example is that at the top of the credit cycle, individual financial 
institutions look sound because measured risk is low, while the financial system becomes increasingly 
fragile as imbalances build up (Minsky, 1986).  
That is exactly what happened in the run-up to the global financial crisis. The build-up of financial 
imbalances made the overall financial system fragile. A subsequent shock (in the form of the Lehmann 
collapse) led to the unravelling of the imbalances, exacerbated by endogenous feedback loops. The 
point is that (almost) nobody was watching, let alone preventing, the building up of the imbalances. Yet, 
Schularick and Taylor (2012) document more than a century of credit booms that turned to bust, with 
leverage cycles at the core of financial crises (see also the classic on financial panics by Kindleberger 
and Aliber, 2011). Moreover, the internal models used by banks for risk management assumed, and still 
assume, that risk is exogenous, while financial risk has a strong endogenous component (Danielsson, 
2013). 
Hanson, Kashyap and Stein (2011) and Galati and Moessner (2013, 2014) provide excellent 
surveys on macroprudential supervision. While there is now consensus that financial supervision has to 
focus on the aggregate (macroprudential), in addition to the individual (microprudential), there is no 
agreed macroprudential framework for measuring financial imbalances and applying policies to correct 
such imbalances. This paper focuses on these two open questions in the so-called time dimension of 
macroprudential policy. The companion paper by Barth and Wihlborg (2016) on too-big-to-fail, 
addresses the cross-sectional dimension of macroprudential policy. In our paper, we argue for a sector-
wide approach, beyond banking. Macroprudential policy is extra challenging in the euro area, where the 
single monetary policy might aggravate credit growth in certain parts of the euro area, but not in other 
parts. 
Our preliminary conclusion is that the evolution of macroprudential policy might well follow that 
of monetary policy. First, the theoretical framework of inflation targeting has been developed. Next, the 
inflation outlook over the medium term has been measured and presented to central bank policy-
makers. This outlook has been used for analysing the monetary policy stance. Finally, the central bank 
has decided on its policy rate to ‘correct’ deviations from the medium term goal. Although 
macroprudential policy is more complicated and multi-dimensional (Goodhart, 2014), the cyclical 
component of macroprudential supervision could follow the monetary path. 
This paper follows the same steps. Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework for 
macroprudential supervision. Section 3 examines emerging approaches to measurement of the financial 
cycle. Section 4 proposes the use of a common leverage ratio, as a new policy instrument to contain 
excessive credit growth across the financial system, and suggests concrete steps towards its 
implementation, building on current legislation and policy discussions. Section 5 examines the 
interaction of the proposed common leverage ratio with liquidity requirements. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The theoretical framework1 
Macroprudential supervision is the missing link in the broader monetary and financial policy 
framework, as the global financial crisis and subsequent euro sovereign crisis painfully highlighted. In 
several nations including the United States, Ireland and Spain, spectacular rises in house prices were 
accompanied by unsustainable credit growth. The bursting of the US bubble was not a microprudential, 
                                                 
1 This section draws partly upon the introduction of a VoxEU book on Macroprudentialism (Schoenmaker, 2014). 
‘bad loan’ event, but triggered the largest crisis the world has seen since the Great Depression. The 
bursting of the Irish and Spanish bubbles threatened national solvency, not just bank solvency.  
Central bankers and other macroeconomic policymakers stood by and watched the problems 
accumulating because they thought it was sufficient to conduct monetary policy and microprudential 
supervision. But the former is only concerned with the inflation of consumer goods, ignoring inflated 
asset prices. And the latter is only concerned with the soundness of individual financial institutions, 
using internal models that are run on the assumption that risk is exogenous. The Global Financial and 
euro sovereign crises showed that the financial system as a whole matters and that the unravelling of 
risk has endogenous feedback loops (Brunnermeier et al, 2009).  
Figure 1 shows the new policy framework and places macroprudential supervision in the middle 
of monetary policy and microprudential supervision. Macroprudentialism has moved to the centre of the 
policy agenda (Baker, 2013) and interacts with both other policy areas. Macroprudential supervision 
operates at the level of the financial system and is concerned with the impact on the wider economy. 
Asia learned its lesson after its own crisis in the late 1990s, and introduced macroprudential policies 
earlier. Hong Kong, for example, has adopted an aggressive loan-to-value policy, under which the Hong 
Kong Monetary Authority reduces the ratio for new mortgages when house prices are rising too fast. 
Central banks are returning to their roots by re-assuming a broad mandate. History teaches us 
that central banks have always had a dual role: maintaining price stability and financial stability 
(Goodhart, 2011). Accordingly, financial stability departments of central banks have been strengthened. 
Moreover, new structures are being put in place to facilitate proper coordination between the major 
players: finance ministries, central banks and financial supervisors (for details, see ASC, 2014). At the 
global level, the Financial Stability Board coordinates between the authorities of the major countries. 
There is consensus on the broad objectives of macroprudential supervision. With respect to the 
time dimension, macroprudentialism should increase the resilience of the financial system against 
financial shocks. But then the disagreement sets in. Borio (2014b), for example, calls for modesty and 
aims just to increase the resilience of the financial system against financial shocks. In contrast, 
Gersbach and Rochet (2014) would go further, preferring countercyclical policies to constrain financial 
booms, which are fuelled by credit growth. 
 
Figure 1: Policy framework for the financial and economic system 
Policy 
(typical instrument) 
Objective Ultimate goal 
(level of impact) 
   
Monetary policy 
(short-term interest rate) 
Price stability  
  Stable and non-inflationary 
growth (economic system) 
Macroprudential 
(LTV ratios, countercyclical buffers) 
Financial stability  
   
Microprudential 
(capital ratios) 
Soundness of financial 
institutions 
Protection of consumers 
(individual institutions) 
   
Source: Based on Schoenmaker and Wierts (2011). 
 
With respect to the cross-sectional dimension, macroprudentialism aims to strengthen the 
structure of the financial system. Systemic capital surcharges for the large banks have been proposed 
to reduce the ‘too-big-to-fail’ subsidy, as Barth and Wihlborg (2016) point out. Several countries – such 
as Switzerland, the US, the UK, Sweden and the Netherlands – have introduced higher capital charges for 
their large banks. Another structural instrument is to reduce large exposures. Examples of overexposures 
leading to banking crises are the exposure of US money centre banks to Latin America in the 1980s, 
exposure of banks to housing during many crises, and the recent exposure of some western European 
banks to eastern Europe. In the aftermath of the euro sovereign crisis, there have been calls for the 
introduction of large-exposure rules when it comes to exposure to sovereign debt. From a risk 
perspective, these large-exposure rules are more important than risk weights for sovereigns. In the 
remainder of this paper, we focus on the time dimension of macroprudential policy. 
On the overall policy framework, there is a long-standing debate on how monetary and 
macroprudential policies should interact. Tucker (2014) stresses the role of macroprudential policy as 
separate from that of monetary policy. Macroprudential policy takes a more granular approach by 
targeting particular markets or sectors, such as housing and property markets. In contrast, Borio (2014b) 
argues that monetary and macroprudential policies work in tandem since monetary policy influences 
risk perceptions and risk appetite (the risk-taking channel). A third view is that of Stein (2013), who says 
that monetary policy is more pervasive because it “gets in all the cracks” of the financial system. 
Finally, there is the issue of how to strike the right balance between macroprudentialism and 
microprudentialism? A number of authors argue that macro stability should have priority over micro 
soundness (Schoenmaker and Kremers, 2014; Tucker, 2014). In a more reflective mode, Borio (2014b) 
argues that macroprudentialism stands for an intellectual orientation or lens through which the task of 
achieving financial stability is understood. Prudential tools should be designed through a macro lens 
instead of the prevailing micro lens. 
 
2.1 The case for countercyclical macroprudential supervision 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) document a long history of debt financed booms and busts, with 
severe implications for financial stability and the real economy. There are various amplification 
mechanisms at work in the financial system, which are endogenous. The basic mechanism is that debt 
financing (leverage) is increased to maximise profits during good times, when asset values (collateral) 
are high and measured risk is low (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Geanakoplos, 2010). A first example is 
banks, which expand their business with high levels of debt during good times (Adrian and Shin, 2010). 
Another example is housing finance, with increasingly large mortgages granted during housing booms 
(Almeida et al, 2006). Likewise, leveraged buyouts by private equity firms are subject to boom-bust 
cycles and relatively large portions of debt financing (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009). Financial markets 
can also be pro-cyclical when haircuts for securities financing transactions are reduced in good times 
and increased in bad times (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). At the turning point of the financial 
cycle, a small initial shock might trigger a margin and loss spiral that impedes funding and market 
liquidity. A similar interaction between leverage and funding liquidity also operates in the banking 
system (Pierret, 2015). 
Although the exact form in which a speculative bubble manifests itself might differ each time, 
the underlying dynamics are the same. Yet, Galbraith (1993) observed dryly:  
“What will not be discussed is that speculation itself or the aberrant optimism that lay behind it. 
Nothing is more remarkable than this: in the aftermath of speculation, the reality will all but 
ignored.” 
 
We develop a simple model illustrating how debt financing can amplify financial shocks 
(Schoenmaker and Wierts, 2015). Profit maximisation is the key driver behind the banks’ choice of 
leverage, defined as debt over equity 𝐿𝐿 = 𝐷𝐷 𝐸𝐸� . Individual banks trade off private return 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒  versus 
private risk and do not internalise market failures from high leverage and maturity mismatch. Leverage 
will amplify the impact of the return difference between assets 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎  and debt 𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑  on the private return: 
𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡
𝑒𝑒 = 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 + �𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 − 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡         (1) 
 
The incentive to leverage depends on the difference in the return from assets and debt, whereby 
banks’ assets have a longer maturity than debt. Leverage thus interacts with maturity mismatch. A profit-
maximising bank will maximise its leverage for a given risk, when asset returns are higher than the cost 
of debt (asset boom), and vice versa (asset bust). During the upswing of the financial cycle, the return 
differential is magnified both by rising asset prices and cheap short-term funding (Perotti and Suarez, 
2011), so that financial institutions increase profits by expanding balance sheets and building up 
maturity mismatches. Adrian and Shin (2010) show that US investment banks did not only bring 
leverage back to its initial level through balance-sheet adjustment, but even increased leverage in the 
run-up to the financial crisis. Similarly, ESRB (2015a) shows that leverage was pro-cyclical in the EU 
banking system. 
Our model with profit-maximising banks driving leverage fits in a new strand of models on 
countercyclical macroprudential policy. Aikman et al (2015) develop a slightly different model, in which 
risk taking is driven by reputational concerns. Banks have an incentive to produce high returns – if 
necessary by excessive risk taking – when other banks announce high returns. They call this the 
‘keeping up with the Goldmans’ effect. The result of their model is similar, a credit cycle with large 
amplifications. Acharya and Naqvi (2012) show that volume-based compensation for loan officers 
induces excessive risk-taking and credit creation. Gersbach and Rochet (2014) find that banks allocate 
too much borrowing capacity to good states and too little to bad states, because bankers aim to 
maximise their rents from lending, taking capital prices and prices of financial assets as given. 
In our model, we use the conservative assumption in terms of behavioural response that a profit-
maximising financial institution would ‘only’ bring leverage back to its initial level 𝐿𝐿0. This means that 
when equity increases because of excess profits in an upturn, debt is increased by the same percentage 
to maintain initial leverage 𝐿𝐿0. This leads to an expansion of the balance sheet in good times. Figure 2 
illustrates the effect on a financial institution’s balance sheet with leverage and feedback effect on asset 
prices. We assume asset price growth of 2.5 percent in period 1, and a moderate feedback effect of 0.1 
in each period on the asset price growth rate in the previous period, so that it drops to zero in a few periods 
and the size of the balance sheet stabilises. Various levels of initial leverage 𝐿𝐿0 = 𝐷𝐷0 𝐸𝐸0�   are used: 
𝐿𝐿0 = 24 = 96 4� ; 𝐿𝐿0 = 9 = 90 10� ; 𝐿𝐿0 = 4 = 80 20� . We also show the case of no leverage 𝐿𝐿0 =0. The balance sheet expands very rapidly for higher levels of initial leverage, but not in the case of no 
leverage. Note that the example with a high leverage of 24 corresponds to the current situation for banks, 
in which banks have about 4 percent equity capital (unweighted) and 96 percent debt.  
Similarly, the balance sheet shrinks during bad times, when the return on assets is below the 
return on debt. As the financial institution makes a loss, equity will decrease. To keep leverage constant, 
the institution has to bring back its debt. This is the infamous process of deleveraging that we 
experienced in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. 
 
Figure 2:  Balance sheet growth with leverage 
 
Note: Assumed price growth is 2.5 per cent. The feedback effect on asset prices is 0.1 for each simulated leverage 𝐿𝐿 =
𝐷𝐷
𝐸𝐸� = 0;  4;  9;  24. 
Source: Schoenmaker and Wierts (2015). 
 
The key take-aways from our simple model are threefold (Schoenmaker and Wierts, 2015). First, 
modest levels of debt financing might already lead to relatively large expansion of the balance sheets of 
financial firms in upturns. Second, the feedback loop on the balance sheet is endogenous. A return 
differential on assets and debt of 2.5 percent combined with a leverage of 24 (which is common in 
banking) leads to a 75 percent expansion of the bank’s balance sheet. Third, for higher initial leverage, 
the policy adjustment would need to be stronger to constrain excessive balance-sheet growth at 
financial institutions (note that the asset side of financial institutions’ balance sheets approximates the 
provision of finance – predominantly credit – to the private sector). Restricting maximum permissible 
leverage would dampen amplification of the financial cycle, as we discuss in Section 4.  
 
2.2 Macroprudential supervision in the euro area 
Special considerations apply to the euro area in the presence of the monetary and banking 
union. Macroprudential policy is even more important in a monetary union. With a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
monetary policy, proactive macroprudential policies are needed to address financial imbalances at the 
country level. While there is clear evidence that the financial cycles differ at the country level (Merler, 
2015), there is no consensus on the appropriate level of coordination. Figure 3 depicts the current 
division of powers. In monetary and supervisory policy, the European Central Bank (ECB) takes the lead 
with some contributing role for national central banks (NCBs) and national competent authorities (NCAs). 
In contrast, in macroprudential policy the NCAs have the first say, with the ECB in a secondary role.  
 
Figure 3: Policy framework for the euro area 
Union Dimension Major players 
   
 
Monetary union 
 
    Monetary 
 
 
 
ECB with NCBs 
 
 
Banking union 
 
    Macro 
 
 
 
   Micro 
 
NCAs with ECB 
 
 
ECB with NCAs 
 
   
Source: Schoenmaker (2014). 
 
Sapir (2014) and Schoenmaker (2014) argue for a strong role for the ECB. If too much is left to 
the national level, emerging financial imbalances might go unchecked in some countries. There is also a 
risk of inconsistent application of macroprudential tools, while there are strong cross-border stability 
effects within a monetary and banking union. Finally, a consistent policy framework for a broader 
financial union suggests the alignment of the various policy tools at the same level. 
 
3. Measuring financial imbalances 
The global financial crisis has reminded us that we need to include financial sector variables in 
macroeconomic analysis (eg Drehmann et al, 2012; Borio, 2014a). The so-called financial cycle, which 
measures financial imbalances, is the input for defining the macroprudential policy stance. The regular 
publication of the financial cycle will visually raise the awareness of policymakers. We propose to start 
central banks’ financial stability reviews with an update of the financial cycle, just as the monetary report 
starts with the inflation outlook. While the latter is on a monthly or quarterly basis, financial cycle 
dynamics are more prolonged (see below). The update could therefore follow the bi-annual rhythm of 
the financial stability review. 
Section 3.1 discusses the choice of indicators, an important methodological issue, and the 
relationship with the business cycle. Section 3.2 shows the current financial cycles across the euro area, 
illustrating major divergence between counties. 
 
3.1 Which indicators should be in the financial cycle? 
Which financial indicators capture best the financial cycle? On the one hand, you might want to 
extract as much information from financial variables as possible, which is a paradise for 
econometricians. On the other hand, you might want to keep the number of variables as parsimonious 
as possible. Moreover, the choice of a few key variables, which are easily understandable, aids the policy 
process. It helps when policymakers understand which variables are driving the financial cycle, instead 
of deriving the financial cycle as an outcome from an abstract, statistical, analysis. 
There is a wide spectrum of proposed indicators in the literature. Ranging from credit as a key 
variable (eg Schularick and Taylor, 2012; Aikman et al, 2015), to credit and property prices (eg Claessens 
et al, 2011; Drehmann et al, 2012; Borio, 2014a) and credit, property, equity and bond prices (e.g Schüler 
et al, 2015). There is an emerging consensus in the literature that credit and property prices capture best 
the financial cycle. These variables should not be read as indicators for where the next crisis will come 
from, but as a general measurement of financial imbalances which makes the economy crisis-prone in 
the Minsky sense. 
In a historical survey covering 1870 to 2008, Schularick and Taylor (2012) showed that cyclical 
fluctuations in credit are at the heart of the boom-bust cycle. The next question is which assets are 
financed by these episodes of credit expansion (and subsequent contraction). In follow-up work, Jorda, 
Schularick and Taylor (2015) studied bubbles in housing and equity markets over the past 140 years in 
17 countries. They demonstrate that what makes some bubbles more dangerous than others is credit. 
When fuelled by credit booms, asset price bubbles increase financial crisis risks; upon collapse they 
tend to be followed by deeper recessions and slower recoveries. Credit-financed house price bubbles 
have emerged as a particularly dangerous phenomenon. These findings are consistent with earlier work 
by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and Claessens et al (2014), who also show that the vast majority of 
banking crises are related to house price cycles. 
Credit booms fuel house prices and increase the leverage of borrowers (in particular 
households). This leaves households vulnerable to declines in house prices and tightening of credit 
conditions. When the correction occurs, households run into debt servicing problems, which cause 
reductions in consumption negatively impacting on economic growth as well as payment arrears on 
mortgages or foreclosures leading to systemic risks in the financial system. 
Drehmann et al (2012) also found that credit and property prices tend to co-vary rather closely 
with each other, especially at low frequencies, confirming the importance of credit in the financing of 
construction and the purchase of property. In addition, the variability in the two series is dominated by 
the low-frequency components. By contrast, equity prices can be a distraction. They co-vary with the 
other two series far less. And much of their variability concentrates at comparatively higher frequencies. 
Claessens et al (2011) investigate credit, housing and equity cycles. They also report strong co-
movements in credit and housing cycles. Credit cycles accompanied by housing cycles typically last 
longer and are more pronounced. 
Next, Claessens et al (2011) find that signals from equity cycles are noisy, as these are shorter-
lived and coincide less with financial crises. By contrast, Schüler et al (2015) include equity and bond 
prices in addition to credit and property assets. They claim that their composite financial cycle performs 
better at predicting financial crises than single or bivariate composed indicators. Nevertheless, Schüler 
et al (2015) also find that credit and house prices are characterised by medium-term cycles, while equity 
prices have important fluctuations both at medium and short-term cycle frequencies. 
Cyclical fluctuations in benchmark bond yields can also be attributed to shorter and medium 
frequencies (Schüler et al, 2015). Bond yields are thus more relevant for the shorter frequency business 
cycles, which are analysed for monetary policy purposes. In order to keep monetary and 
macroprudential policies separate, we argue that bond yields should not be included in the financial 
cycle. 
Finally, Borio (2014a) characterises the financial cycle in relation to the business cycle. First, 
the financial cycle has a stronger amplitude. Borio (2014a) finds a five times stronger fluctuation. Borio 
(2014a) reports an average length of 16 years, while Schüler et al (2015) find a length of 7.2 years. While 
the exact length may differ in different studies, they all indicate that the average length is longer than 
that of the business cycle. This reinforces the earlier argument that the financial cycle can be qualified 
as a medium-term phenomenon, which is best captured by credit and property prices that also have a 
medium-term frequency. Figure 4 illustrates the differences in the business and financial cycles in the 
US for the 1970-2013 period.  
 
  
Figure 4. The business and financial cycle in the US (1970-2013) 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Borio (2014a). Note: The dark line traces the financial cycle measured by the combined behaviour of 
the component series (credit, the credit to GDP ratio and house prices). The light line traces the GDP cycle. 
 
3.2 The financial cycle in the euro area 
Moving to Europe, we are interested to see the behaviour of the financial cycle in the euro area. 
Do the aggregate and country cycles move in tandem? Merler (2015) investigates the financial cycle, 
based on the variance of credit growth and real house prices growth, for the period from 1971 till 2014. 
Figure 5 illustrates the aggregate financial cycle for the euro area and its sub-regions. The North 
comprises Germany and the Netherlands. The Centre encompasses France and Italy. The South consists 
of Ireland and Spain. Figure 5 clearly shows that financial cycles have differed across the euro area since 
the late 1990s, the start of the euro. The single monetary policy might have contributed to the divergence 
of the financial cycle. 
Another interesting finding is that the periphery countries in the ‘South’ faced a strong expansion 
ahead of the global financial crisis, which started in 2007, while the aggregate euro-area cycle is more 
moderate (Merler, 2015). This reinforces the point that macroprudential policy needs to be applied at 
country level across Europe. Importantly, if a countercyclical macroprudential policy had been in place 
at the start of the euro, this might have dampened the financial cycle in the periphery countries (Jiménez 
et al, 2015). But we do not know the counterfactual, of course. Nevertheless, Figure 5 strongly suggests 
that countercyclical macroprudential instruments are very useful and need to be differentiated across 
countries. 
Figure 6, also taken from Merler (2015), shows the financial cycle for the six countries. Panel C 
for Spain and Ireland shows that the introduction of the euro seemed to coincide with the start of a big 
expansion phase in the financial cycle. In Ireland, there was a temporary downturn related to the dot-
com bubble burst, but it was quickly reverted into an expansion phase. In Germany and the Netherlands 
(Panel A), the opposite happened, and both countries entered a contraction phase in the late 1990s. 
Contraction lasted till 2010 in Germany and longer in the Netherlands. Finally, Panel B indicates that 
France and Italy instead moved very closely to the euro-area financial cycle. 
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the power of visual presentation. Regular reporting in the ECB Financial 
Stability Review of the unfolding financial cycles in the participating countries might have alerted 
policymakers. The next step is an appropriate instrument to curb the cycle. 
 
Figure 5. Financial Cycle in the euro area  
 
 
Source: Merler (2015). Note: The financial cycle is based on credit growth and growth in real house prices. EA is the euro area; 
North is Germany and the Netherlands; Centre is France and Italy. South is Spain and Ireland. 
Figure 6. Financial Cycles – Individual countries vs. euro area (red line) 
 
Panel A: The North 
 
Germany (blue line) Netherlands (blue line) 
  
 
Panel B: The Centre 
France (blue line) Italy (blue line) 
  
 
Panel C: The South 
Spain (blue line) Ireland (blue line) 
  
 
Source: Merler (2015). 
4. Policy 
The Tinbergen Rule suggests that we need a new instrument separate from monetary policy for 
financial stability purposes. While the underlying mechanism of amplification of the financial cycle 
through leverage in Section 2 is general, macroprudential policy instruments are developed in silos 
(Schoenmaker and Wierts, 2015). The Basel policy response with a countercyclical capital buffer and a 
leverage ratio is only directed at banks. By contrast, loan-to-value (LTV) ratios are borrower based and 
can be designed so that they apply to all financial institutions that grant mortgages.2 But sectoral 
regulations intensify the boundary problem (Goodhart, 2008). When regulation for one sector is 
tightened, business will shift to other sectors with less or no requirements. Cizel et al (2015) find 
evidence for the cross-sector substitution effects of macroprudential policy.  
There are several proposals for countercyclical macroprudential policy instruments to curb the 
financial cycle. Gersbach (2011) proposes a leverage ratio for the banking system to moderate credit 
cycles and to reduce the likelihood of financial crises. His banking system-wide leverage ratio is defined 
as; 
• total equity in the banking sector (held by non-banks) to  
• total end-borrower lending (loans to non-financial firms, households, and governments), plus 
other non-bank assets.  
 
As the system leverage ratio applies to the banking system as a whole, the leverage ratios for 
individual banks can differ according to their risk profile. An interesting feature is that Gersbach’s system 
leverage ratio is really a macro instrument, which can be used in a time-varying manner. The aggregate 
leverage ratio for the next period, for example, depends on the ratio that is currently set, the state of 
money and credit, and on current vulnerabilities of the banking system (Gersbach, 2011). While it is 
impossible to specify a fixed formula for determining the aggregate leverage ratio, Gersbach stresses 
                                                 
2 In practice, LTV caps have mostly been applied to banks, however (Cizel et al, 2015). 
that it is essential that such policies are as systematic, transparent and accountable as traditional 
monetary policy rules. 
More generally, several authors have studied the appropriate design of countercyclical capital 
buffers, as currently employed in the Basel 3 capital adequacy framework (see, for example, Drehman 
et al, 2011; Gersbach and Rochet, 2014). Aikman et al (2015) propose to apply anti-cyclical capital and 
liquidity requirements or to tie remuneration packages to long-term performance to curb the credit cycle. 
Importantly, the latter authors argue that these instruments should be applied across borders and 
sectors to prevent cross-border and cross-sector leakages. 
 
4.1 A common leverage ratio across the financial system3 
We have proposed a countercyclical leverage ratio to dampen the endogenous feedback loops 
in credit growth (and decline) and thus stabilise the financial cycle (Schoenmaker and Wierts, 2015). 
This instrument is designed in the spirit of Gersbach (2011), but applied to individual financial 
institutions and their transactions. This new framework differs from the traditional view on regulation of 
equity as a buffer against unexpected losses caused by exogenous shocks. Whereas the ‘buffer view’ 
can only motivate relatively small capital buffers, our new framework calls for much lower levels of 
leverage in the system to constrain excessive credit growth. 
As discussed earlier, an integrated approach to regulate leverage is necessary to stabilise the 
financial cycle across the financial system. We therefore start with harmonising the terminology on 
leverage (Schoenmaker and Wierts, 2015). Under the Basel 3 capital requirements, the leverage ratio for 
banks is: 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒         (2) 
 
                                                 
3 This sub-section draws upon Schoenmaker and Wierts (2015). 
The leverage ratio can be applied to any type of financial institution, such as banks, special 
purpose vehicles (SPVs), or hedge funds. It can also be applied to collateralised transactions of different 
entities, such as securities financing transactions (eg repos) or mortgages. As the value of assets can 
vary depending on credit and market risk, the transaction is typically ‘overcollateralised’, whereby more 
assets are provided than the underlying loan (debt). This excess is called a haircut: 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = (𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸∗𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒)−𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸∗𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒
= 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸
𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸∗𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒
      (3) 
 
Finally, a typical indicator used in housing finance is the loan-to-value ratio: 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒          (4) 
 
Comparing the different yardsticks for leverage, we get 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 1 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿. Following 
Basel 3, we propose to use the leverage ratio, which is defined as a minimum equity requirement, as the 
basis for a system-wide regulatory leverage requirement. This common leverage ratio is equivalent to a 
maximum debt requirement to constrain credit. 
Microprudential regulation attunes the leverage ratio for each (regulated) segment to the 
underlying risk for an individual institution or market. We observe a wide range of leverage ratios across 
the financial system from 1 percent for special purpose vehicles to 20 percent for mortgages 
(Schoenmaker and Wierts, 2015). We introduce our minimum common leverage ratio to stabilise the 
financial cycle. This macroprudential requirement should override microprudential requirements, as the 
former internalises the endogenous effects of leverage (Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014). Again in the 
spirit of Gersbach (2011), the countercyclical application of our common leverage ratio depends on the 
state of credit, ie where we are in the financial cycle. In the upswing, the common leverage ratio will be 
increased to slow down credit growth, while in the down-swing, the ratio will be decreased to stimulate 
credit growth. 
In Schoenmaker and Wierts (2015), we illustrate the working of the common leverage ratio with 
a hypothetical example of a minimum leverage ratio requirement of 10 percent at the macro level applied 
to debt-based financing across the financial system (which is equivalent to a leverage of 9 in Figure 2). 
This 10 percent would then serve as a minimum across all debt-financed segments of the financial 
system, mitigating the boundary problem. In individual segments, the minimum leverage ratio could be 
higher if and when micro considerations require a higher minimum requirement. 
 
4.2 What would change in practice? 
Market failures and systemic risk are not unique to regulated banking. Examples include: the 
near collapse of hedge fund LTCM in 1998 because of excessive leverage; market-based finance and 
securitisation in the run-up to the financial crisis, which exacerbated the upswing of the financial cycle; 
the default of Lehman, a highly leveraged investment bank; the run on money market funds because of 
maturity mismatch (ie the perception of a nominally stable net asset value); and pro-cyclicality in the 
repo market (Gorton and Metrick, 2012). At the same time, macroprudential instruments have until now 
mostly been applied to banks, causing substitution effects (Cizel et al, 2015). What would be the 
practical implications of our proposed system-wide application of the leverage ratio? 
Table 1 summarises existing instruments and ongoing discussions on the regulation of leverage. 
The message is that limits on leverage already exist for banks, investment funds and residential real 
estate. And extensions are under discussion, eg margin requirements for collateralised derivatives and 
securities financing transactions. But the instrument has not yet been developed from a holistic 
perspective: a common minimum while allowing for country- and sector-specific calibrations, to address 
differences in financial cycles across countries and sector-specific risks such as those related to real 
estate. 
The first step is to compare definitions and to make them consistent, including on the impact of 
derivatives on synthetic leverage both for banks and investment funds (ECB, 2015a). A holistic approach 
to minimum haircuts and margins in both centrally- and non-centrally cleared transactions should be 
developed (ESRB, 2015b). And leverage requirements for Alternative Investment Funds – including 
hedge funds and private equity – should be made operational given that the legal base has been created 
already. All this would allow for initial discussions on the top-down calibration of all instruments together. 
 
Table 1. Macroprudential instruments for regulating leverage 
 
Regulated 
Entities Transactions by entity 
(collateralised financing) 
Banks Investment Funds Real Estate 
Transactions 
Derivatives and Securities Financing 
Transactions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regulation 
EU: CRR/CRD IV: 
Minimum leverage ratio 
 
Under discussion  
Macroprudential use of 
the leverage ratio – 
aligning it with the 
countercyclical capital 
buffer (ESRB, 2015a) 
EU: alternative 
investment funds 
(AIFMD) 
Option to impose 
leverage 
requirements 
 
EU: UCITS: 
Borrowing up to 10% 
of assets allowed for 
temporary purposes 
National legislation: 
LTV/ LTI caps for 
residential real estate 
 
Under discussion: 
LTV/ LTI limits for 
commercial real estate 
Under discussion: 
Minimum or countercyclical margin 
and haircut requirements for centrally 
cleared transactions (ESRB, 2015b) 
and non-centrally cleared 
transactions (BCBS-IOSCO, 2015; FSB, 
2014).4 Application should be to 
counterparties at transaction level, 
independent of how they are cleared 
(ECB, 2015b) 
 
The second step is to analyse the interaction between leverage requirements, including possible 
gaps and overlaps. On gaps, for example, some countries have recently started to apply monitoring 
requirements on ‘non-securitisation’ SPVs. On possible overlaps, for example, the imposition of leverage 
requirements on the banking sector sparked a discussion about its effects on banks’ securities and 
financing transactions, ie their possible migration to less-regulated entities. Likewise, the combination 
of a leverage requirement on banks with an LTV limit for their borrowers might lead to the migration of 
mortgage financing to less-regulated non-banks. This could be seen as a desirable side-effect, as Europe 
suffers from a bank bias that increases systemic risks and reduces economic growth (Langfield and 
Pagano, 2016). But the point is that policymakers should be in a position to take a holistic view on 
introducing and withdrawing such incentives. 
                                                 
4 Both EMIR and the draft Securities Financing Transactions regulation do not at this stage provide for macro-prudential use of 
margin and haircuts by authorities. EMIR does however contain minimum standards for CCPs that aim at addressing pro-
cyclicality (ESRB, 2015b). 
The third step is to incorporate the new instrument consistently in legislation. The European 
Commission is responsible for proposing financial sector regulation in the EU/EEA. As the Commission 
follows a sectoral approach, the directives and/or regulations for the various debt-financed sectors might 
need to be adapted and extended with a macroprudential section. As indicated, several segments are 
already subject to the possibility of regulation on leverage, such as banks under the Capital 
Requirements Regulation and Directive (CRR/CRD IV) and hedge funds and private equity under the so-
called Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD). Whereas the authorities can already 
adjust leverage requirements for alternative investment funds to address systemic risk, similar 
provisions are under discussion for the banking sector (ESRB, 2015a). Next, securities and derivative 
transactions are subject to margin calls or haircuts under the European Market Infrastructure Regulation 
(EMIR). These rules should be adapted to provide the authorities with the power to allow for a common 
and countercyclical application (ESRB, 2015b, ECB, 2015b). Importantly, ECB (2015b) argues that these 
tools should be applied to counterparties at transaction level so that all relevant transactions are within 
scope, irrespective of how they are cleared. This would mimic our preferred legal design for LTV/LTI caps 
and create a consistent legal approach (Table 1). 
On the institutional side, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) should be given an advisory 
role on the application of the common leverage ratio, as the ESRB is responsible for monitoring systemic 
risk across the EU and making recommendations when it identifies systemic threats. A building up of 
financial imbalances that are unsustainable would qualify as such a threat.  
Moving to execution, the respective central banks – in their capacity as macroprudential 
authorities – need to get the powers in the newly drafted macroprudential sections of the above 
mentioned directives and regulations to apply the countercyclical instrument, independently from 
politicians. The execution of macroprudential policy is, just as monetary policy, subject to pressures 
from the election cycle. Moreover, these powers should also allow for a macro application of the 
instrument with a view to financial stability. 
As suggested in Section 2, the ECB should under the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
become responsible for the consistent application of macroprudential instruments within the euro area 
and internalisation of cross-border effects. The ECB would also be able to assess the trade-offs between 
the different financial policies – monetary, macroprudential and microprudential – at the same level, 
just like the Bank of England in the United Kingdom.5 While the NCBs are necessary to provide input on 
the financial conditions in their respective financial systems, the ECB should therefore in conjunction 
with the NCBs have the power to set the minimum countercyclical leverage ratio. The leverage ratio could 
then be differentiated across countries and sectors, because the financial cycle differs between them. 
 
5. Interaction with liquidity 
The time dimension of macroprudential policy captures systemic risk from both excessive 
leverage and maturity mismatch (Schoenmaker and Wierts, 2011; Galati and Moessner, 2014). This is 
reflected in our simple model in section 2: leverage amplifies the return differential between assets and 
debt, which is a function of maturity mismatch. Duijm and Wierts (2015) provide empirical evidence on 
the correlation between the leverage cycle, short-term funding and aggregate liquidity risk. Pierret 
(2015) measures the interaction between leverage and liquidity during a crisis. She finds that the 
interaction between the leverage ratio and market shocks (measure by the fall in the market to book 
value) explains access to funding. 
An open issue is whether our leverage requirement needs to be complemented with a 
macroprudential liquidity instrument, on top of minimum liquidity requirements where they are in place 
(such as the Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Net Stable Funding Ratio in banking). Pierret (2015) argues 
that capital is the key instrument, as it not only addresses solvency risk problems but also improves 
funding liquidity. Likewise, Admati and Hellwig (2013) argue that the core issue is capital. Perotti and 
                                                 
5 The combination of all these financial policies would lead to a concentration of powers. Appropriate transparency and 
accountability mechanisms are important. 
Suarez (2011) agree that capital requirements are the most important instrument, but are in favour of a 
complementary levy on short-term funding.6 
In our view, the most relevant question at this stage is not whether macroprudential liquidity 
regulation should be introduced in banking, but whether quantitative minimum liquidity standards 
should be introduced for investment funds. Most investment funds rely on equity funding. But this equity 
funding is often of a short-term nature, as it is redeemable on demand for open-ended funds. Given that 
maturity mismatches are subject now to regulation in the banking sector, the incentive to build-up a 
maturity mismatch may shift to other sectors. The current low interest rate environment and search for 
yield are expected to aggravate such incentives. 
 
6. Conclusions 
There has been much debate on the need for macroprudential policy in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis. Academics and policymakers have advanced various theories and models, but a 
consensus on the right approach has not yet emerged. Nevertheless, we call the central banking 
community to arms. The current monetary policy stance of quantitative easing might be needed to avert 
potential deflationary drifts and stimulate subdued growth, the risk of financial booms is increasing as 
the BIS has repeatedly warned. In the Tinbergen tradition, we propose a separate instrument to constrain 
excessive credit growth. The good news is that central banks are starting to measure and publish the 
financial cycle, which provides the necessary input for determining the macroprudential policy stance. 
While there is an emerging consensus that countercyclical capital ratios are helpful, there is 
widespread doubt that the current 2.5 percent countercyclical buffer as part of the risk-weighted capital 
ratio will suffice to break a full-blown credit cycle. With an average risk weight of less than 40 percent, 
the 2.5 percent risk-weighted buffer translates to a countercyclical leverage buffer of less than 1 percent. 
                                                 
6 More generally, and somewhat beyond our topic, Perotti and Goodhart (2015) point to a long-term increase in maturity 
mismatch in banking. They call for a range of structural measures – including maximum LTV rates and higher stable funding 
ratios – to limit it. 
Simulations indicate that a countercyclical leverage buffer of up to 2 percent is more appropriate to 
dampen an asset price shock (Schoenmaker and Wierts, 2015). 
We therefore propose a bold approach based on the leverage ratio. Bold because the range of 
appropriate leverage ratios to constrain the financial cycle is likely to go beyond the current leverage 
ratio of 3 percent. We recommend to starting calibrations on an appropriate range for the leverage ratio. 
Our proposal is also bold because the common leverage ratio should be applied across all parts of the 
financial system that are highly leveraged. As banks are deleveraging, non-bank credit is growing. This 
warrants a system-wide approach to constrain excessive credit growth. 
To stimulate (bold) action, we would like to leave the reader with a final thought. Policymakers 
and academics (including ourselves) love to read again and quote the classics such as Galbraith (1993) 
and Kindleberger and Aliber (2011) after each financial crisis. Some more attention to them in the 
upswing of the financial cycle might, hopefully, reduce future citations. 
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